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Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of government expenditure on private con-
sumption when the private sector anticipates the ﬁscal shocks. In order
to capture anticipation of ﬁscal policy, we develop a new method based
on a structural vector autoregression (SVAR). By simulating data from
a theoretical model featuring (imperfect) ﬁscal foresight, we demon-
strate the ability of our new approach to correctly capture macroeco-
nomic dynamics. We take advantage of the ﬂexibility of our econo-
metric approach and study those subcomponents of total government
spending, which have diﬀerent macroeconomic eﬀects according to eco-
nomic theory. Using post-WWII US data, we ﬁnd that when taking
into account anticipation, private consumption signiﬁcantly decreases
in response to a defense expenditure shock, whereas when considering
shocks to non-defense spending, consumption increases signiﬁcantly. A
standard SVAR does not produce clear consumption responses, high-
lighting the importance of anticipation. Our results thus reconcile the
diﬀerent ﬁndings of the narrative and SVAR approaches to the study of
ﬁscal policy eﬀects.
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The empirical literature on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on the macroeconomy is
inconclusive. It can broadly be divided into two strands according to the identi-
ﬁcation approach. On the one hand, ﬁscal policy events are identiﬁed with the
narrative approach employing dummy variables that indicate large increases
in government expenditure related to wars.1 These foreign policy events are
assumed to be exogenous to the state of the economy and can therefore be used
to identify the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. This line of research typically ﬁnds that
in response to such a shock to government spending, GDP increases whereas
private consumption and real wages fall (Ramey and Shapiro 1998, Edelberg,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher 1999, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 2004). On
the other hand, structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) usually achieve
identiﬁcation by assuming that government spending is predetermined within
the quarter and government revenue does not respond to macroeconomic de-
velopments in the same quarter except for exogenous automatic stabilizers
(Blanchard and Perotti 2002). This strand of the literature ﬁnds that private
consumption, similar to GDP, usually increases after a shock to government
spending. Those results have been conﬁrmed and extended in the papers by
Perotti (2005, 2008), for example.2
These contrasting empirical ﬁndings have important implications for our
view of the macroeconomy. Standard macroeconomic models focusing on ﬁscal
policy such as the neoclassical model of Baxter and King (1993) but also most
New-Keynesian variants (for example, Linnemann and Schabert (2003)) have
an unambiguous prediction concerning the response of private consumption to
a shock to government spending. Whereas output is expected to increase in
response to such a shock, consumption should fall. The central reason for the
latter dynamic response in those models is that government expenditure (ﬁ-
nanced by lump-sum taxes) constitute a withdrawal of resources from the econ-
omy, which in turn do not substitute or complement private consumption nor
1The narrative approach goes back to Romer and Romer (1989) in the area of monetary
policy. A recent paper by Romer and Romer (2009) employs the narrative approach for tax
changes.
2More empirical evidence with respect to European countries is provided by Biau and
Girard (2005) for France, Giordano, Momigliano, Neri, and Perotti (2007) for Italy, de Castro
and de Cos (2008) for Spain, and Tenhofen, Wolﬀ, and Heppke-Falk (2010) for Germany. A
diﬀerent identiﬁcation procedure was proposed by Fat´ as and Mihov (2001) and Mountford
and Uhlig (2009), who also document a positive consumption response.
1contribute to productivity. The resulting adverse wealth eﬀect drives the nega-
tive consumption response. In contrast, Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007)
construct a New-Keynesian model with a positive consumption response, in
order to reconcile current business cycle models with the empirical ﬁndings of
the SVAR literature. Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007) make clear, how-
ever, that many very special conditions have to be fulﬁlled for the model to
be able to generate a positive response of private consumption. In particu-
lar, sticky prices and ”rule-of-thumb” consumers drive the result.3 Empirical
ﬁndings therefore shape our modeling and understanding of the economy. Un-
fortunately, however, the diﬀerent methods employed do not yield consistent
results.
In an important contribution, Ramey (2009) aims at explaining the dif-
ference between the results of the two empirical approaches. She argues that
VAR techniques miss the fact, that major changes in government spending,
such as expenditure related to wars, are usually anticipated. Within a stan-
dard model, it is easy to show, that missing the point of anticipation will result
in a positive response of consumption to a shock to government spending, as
consumption following the initial drop increases with investment. In support
of her hypothesis that shocks are indeed anticipated, Ramey (2009) documents
that the war dummy shocks Granger-cause the VAR shocks, but not vice versa.
These problems ﬁt into the more general discussion on when it is pos-
sible to relate the innovations recovered by a VAR to the shocks of a par-
ticular economic model. Early contributions in this regard are Hansen and
Sargent (1980, 1991), Townsend (1983), Quah (1990), and Lippi and Reichlin
(1993, 1994), with a recent reminder of these problems to the profession in
Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson (2007). An appli-
cation of these insights to ﬁscal policy anticipation, in particular concerning
tax changes, with a thorough discussion of the related issues can be found in
Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009). This literature centers on the fundamental
problem that in certain setups the information sets of the private agents and
the econometrician are misaligned. In the case of ﬁscal policy anticipation,
this means that private agents in addition to the variables observed by the
econometrician know about the ﬁscal policy shocks occurring in future periods
3An earlier contribution featuring a positive consumption response is Devereux, Head,
and Lapham (1996), for instance. In this paper, consumption only increases if returns to
specialization are suﬃciently high.
2and act immediately on this information. The econometrician, on the other
hand, only observing variables up to the current period, does not possess this
information. On a more technical note, (ﬁscal) foresight in a generic dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model may introduce a non-invertible
moving-average (MA) component into the equilibrium process. In this case,
the stochastic process does not possess a representation in current and past
endogenous variables. As a result, standard tools based on VARs, like impulse
response functions or variance decompositions, can yield incorrect inferences.
We contribute to the empirical literature on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy by
explicitly modeling anticipation in an SVAR framework. Our new approach is
designed to align the information sets of the econometrician and the private
agents. Thereby we are able to avoid the problems encountered by standard
VARs in settings featuring ﬁscal policy anticipation. In particular, we are
able to exactly capture a situation, where private agents perfectly know ﬁscal
shocks one period in advance. While our method is not general in the sense
of being applicable in the presence of all possible (and in practice unknown)
kinds of information ﬂows, the ﬁndings of a simulation exercise support our
approach. In particular, this exercise indicates that our methodology is ro-
bust to situations with a potentially diﬀerent information structure. In order
to document the validity of our method, we simulate data from a theoretical
model with ﬁscal foresight, where we demonstrate that the equilibrium process
features a non-invertible MA component by using methods recently developed
by Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson (2007). De-
spite having both anticipated and unanticipated ﬁscal shocks in the model, so
that private agents only have imperfect foresight, our new approach correctly
captures the dynamics within a VAR framework, while a standard VAR does
not deliver the negative consumption response of the theoretical model.
In a next step, we apply our new methodology to real life data to investi-
gate the eﬀects of anticipated ﬁscal policy on private consumption. As Ramey
(2009) argues, ﬁscal policy anticipation could have dramatic consequences by
changing the sign of the consumption response. Our ﬁndings indeed highlight
the importance of taking into account ﬁscal foresight in empirical work. We
show that it is crucial to distinguish those subcomponents of total govern-
ment spending, which might have diﬀerent eﬀects on the macroeconomy. In
this regard, we take advantage of the ﬂexibility of our econometric approach.
Motivated by economic theory and in line with previous studies, we consider
3government defense and non-defense expenditure.4 This allows us to reconcile
the results of the narrative and SVAR approaches mentioned above and qualify
recent ﬁndings in the literature.
We ﬁnd that when taking into account anticipation issues private consump-
tion signiﬁcantly decreases on impact and in subsequent periods in response
to a shock to government defense expenditure, exactly in line with Ramey’s
(2009) ﬁndings using the narrative approach. When considering shocks to
non-defense spending, on the other hand, consumption increases signiﬁcantly
on impact and in the following periods in our expectation augmented VAR.
In contrast, the corresponding responses in a standard VAR ` a la Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) are quite weak and mostly insigniﬁcant. This highlights
the importance of taking into account anticipation issues and is in line with
Ramey’s (2009) general argument, that standard VAR techniques fail to allow
for ﬁscal foresight thereby invalidating the structural analysis.
Furthermore, the responses reported for the expectation augmented VAR
are in line with central predictions of standard macroeconomic models. In those
settings, less productive defense expenditure lead to a decrease in consump-
tion while other, potentially more productive expenditure have the opposite
eﬀect. If we do not separate diﬀerent expenditure components but use total
government spending, we do not obtain clear-cut results, as we lump together
spending items with diﬀerent macroeconomic eﬀects. Our ﬁndings are robust
to adding real GDP and/or a short-term interest rate to the speciﬁcation as
well as to changes in the exogenous elasticities needed to identify the SVAR.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
develops the expectation augmented VAR, while Section 3 presents estimation
results based on model-generated data. Section 4 presents the ﬁndings of the
empirical investigation with a particular focus on government defense and non-
defense expenditure. Section 5 checks robustness and, ﬁnally, the last section
concludes.
4While Blanchard and Perotti (2002) have a short subsection where they distinguish
defense and non-defense expenditure, they only consider the response of output and do not
take into account anticipation issues. Perotti (2008) also distinguishes defense and non-
defense spending shocks in one of his SVAR speciﬁcations. Again, he does not allow for
ﬁscal policy anticipation, which is the main focus of our investigation, where we show the
importance of taking into account those issues.
42 An expectation augmented VAR
In order to explicitly take into account perfectly anticipated ﬁscal policy, we
develop a new empirical approach. It is based on the framework put forward
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which constitutes a well established SVAR
methodology focusing on ﬁscal policy. Their basic idea is to exploit ﬁscal policy
decision lags to identify structural shocks. In particular, the authors argue that
as governments cannot react in the short run, e.g. within the same quarter, to
changes in the macroeconomic environment, reactions of ﬁscal policy to cur-
rent developments only result from so-called “automatic” responses. However,
apart from decision lags, policymaking is also characterized by implementation
lags. After a decision on a spending increase or tax cut, for instance, has been
made, it takes time for the public authorities to implement those measures.
As a result, even though there has been no actual adjustment of the respective
policy instrument yet, private agents already know that there will be a change
in ﬁscal policy, i.e., they anticipate ﬁscal policy actions, and act immediately
on this information. Not taking account of those implementation lags could
invalidate the analysis due to the potential misalignment of the information
sets of the private agents and the econometrician. Such a misalignment arises
particularly in standard setups, where the econometrician uses data only up
to the current period and neglects information on future ﬁscal shocks. Figure
1 summarizes graphically the aforementioned ideas by means of a timeline and
illustrates, in particular, the concepts of decision and implementation lags.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) address anticipation issues by including ex-
pectations of future ﬁscal policy variables in their model. In particular, they
assume that agents perfectly know ﬁscal policy shocks one period in advance
and are able to react to it. Thus, the aforementioned expectations are taken
with respect to an information set which includes next period’s ﬁscal shocks.
Impulse responses to anticipated ﬁscal shock are derived by simulating the sys-
tem under rational expectations. They only consider the response of output,
however, which is weaker but still positive. In particular, they do not report
consumption responses, where anticipation eﬀects could result in a diﬀerent
sign of the response as argued by Ramey (2009). The weaker output eﬀect,
though, might be an indication of a negative consumption response.
To allow for anticipation by the private sector, we go beyond the stan-
dard SVAR of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) by explicitly modeling the pro-
5a
start of policy process
(potentially as a reaction to
macroeconomic developments) decision on policy
implementation of policy
(actual change in fiscal
policy instrument)
time






ONLY "automatic" responses of fiscal
 policy to macroeconomic developments
anticipation horizon
Figure 1: Sequence of events.
cess describing expectation formation within such a multivariate time series
framework. Furthermore, a central contribution of this paper is to investigate
the relevance of anticipation eﬀects for the dynamic response of private con-
sumption to ﬁscal policy shocks. We emphasize in particular the importance
(of the nature) of the particular spending category under consideration, e.g.
productive vs. unproductive public expenditure.
We propose the following setup, based on a standard AB-model SVAR:
Yt = C(L)Yt−1 + Ut (1)
AUt = BVt  (2)
where Yt = [ct gt rt b gt+1 b rt+1]′ is the vector of endogenous variables, Ut is the







t+1]′ is the vector
of structural shocks to be identiﬁed. Here ct denotes real private consumption,
gt is real government expenditure, rt denotes real government revenue, and vi
t
is the respective structural shock.
The important novelty relative to a standard (S)VAR is the presence of b gt+1
and b rt+1 in the preceding equations. These expressions, reﬂecting ﬁscal policy
anticipation, denote the conditional expectation of the respective ﬁscal variable
with respect to current and past endogenous variables as well as next period’s
ﬁscal shocks, i.e., b gt+1 = E(gt+1|Υt v
g
t+1 vr




6where Υt = [yt yt−1 yt−2    ] and yt = [ct gt rt]′. Accordingly, agents in
the economy form expectations about the course of future ﬁscal policy on
the basis of all information available to them. Besides the current and past
realizations of the variables in the system, the agents know about the ﬁscal
shocks occurring next period. These ﬁscal shocks are known as ﬁscal policy
actions require time to be implemented. Moreover, they are usually subject
to a broad public discussion before their actual implementation making the
information available to a very broad audience.
This particular and novel feature of our approach is designed to align the
information sets of the private agents and the econometrician. The goal is to
avoid the problems encountered by standard VARs, when confronted with data
generated from a process featuring a non-invertible moving-average component
due to ﬁscal foresight. Our setup is able to exactly capture a situation, where
private agents have one-period perfect foresight with respect to ﬁscal shocks.
Even though this is not a general approach applicable in the presence of all
possible kinds of information ﬂows, the ﬁndings of the subsequent simulation
exercise support our new method. It indicates that the methodology is robust
to situations with a potentially diﬀerent information structure. Moreover, our
method is easily applicable to diﬀerent spending categories. Without much
eﬀort and in a readily reproducible way, we can go beyond defense spending,
i.e., beyond the point for which studies using the narrative approach exist.
2.1 A simpliﬁed setting: the general idea of our ap-
proach
In order to describe the basic idea of our approach, we ﬁrst consider a simpli-
ﬁed version of the aforementioned model, in particular, a setup which does not
exhibit lagged endogenous variables. This framework, however, easily general-
izes to the standard case including lags, which is discussed subsequently. The
system can be partitioned into two parts: ﬁrst, one set of equations represent-
ing the basic structure of the economy, and second, the remaining equations
modeling the process describing expectation formation.
More speciﬁcally, the basic framework of the economy in the simpliﬁed
setup is given by the ﬁrst three equations of the model, presented here in
7structural form:





















In accordance with our idea of ﬁscal policy anticipation by the private sector
and following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the two expectation terms appear
in the consumption equation. Furthermore, we have to assume a relative or-
dering of the ﬁscal variables. Here we act on the assumption that spending
decisions come ﬁrst, i.e., the structural revenue shock, vr
t, does not enter the
expenditure equation, whereas v
g
t enters the revenue equation.5
As indicated above, the remaining part of the model consists of equations
modeling the process describing expectation formation, in the simple frame-
work given by:


























Even though a standard VAR also implicitly models expectation formation,
here we have to augment the basic VAR equations with the expectation terms
and expectational equations, since we have to deal with a special informational
structure. In particular, not only variables indexed up to time t are part of the
information set with respect to time t, but it also contains future variables,
i.e., shocks indexed t +1. Accordingly, one-period anticipation of ﬁscal policy
actions is reﬂected in the presence of v
g
t+1 and vr
t+1 in the preceding equations.
Analogous expectation terms, however, do not appear in the ﬁscal equations
and there are no separate expectational equations for the non-ﬁscal variables.
That does not mean, that the public sector does not form (rational) expecta-
tions about future developments in the economy. It just reﬂects the fact, that
the ﬁscal authority’s information set with respect to the private sector only in-
cludes variables indexed up to the current period.6 It is hard to think of a case




g are elements of the A and B matrices, respectively.
6As the private sector, the government of course does know its own ﬁscal shocks next
period and its eﬀects on current non-ﬁscal variables. This is reﬂected in the system by
equation (3) in combination with the ﬁscal equations.
8of aggregate implementation lags for the private sector, which would give rise to
the anticipation of future private sector actions by the government, analogous
to the setting of ﬁscal foresight described in this paper. Consequently, we do
not have to augment the ﬁscal equations by expectation terms and the system
by corresponding expectational equations to accommodate such a setup.
Ultimately, we are interested in deriving impulse response functions with
respect to perfectly anticipated ﬁscal policy shocks. Consequently, we have to
obtain the corresponding MA-representation of the model. Concerning con-
sumption, which is the main variable of interest, such a representation in this









































Consequently, concerning government expenditure for example, the dynamic




































= 0 ∀s ≥ 2  (11)
Note, that this is the response to next period’s ﬁscal shock, which is, however,
perfectly anticipated today. In particular, consumption at time t moves in
response to the ﬁscal shock of period t + 1.7
We would like to emphasize the rationale of our expectational equations (6)
and (7). The purpose of those equations is to describe how model-consistent
expectations with respect to future ﬁscal variables are formed. In this respect,
we are not interested in the structural relations between the diﬀerent variables
7Due to the absence of lagged endogenous variables in this simpliﬁed setting, the dynamic
response is zero for ct+s  ∀s ≥ 2. In the general framework, of course, this is typically not
the case as indicated in the impulse responses presented below.
9and thus the structural coeﬃcients, but rather in the expectation of the respec-
tive ﬁscal variable in the sense of an optimal forecast based on the structure of
the economy and all information available to the agent at the respective point
in time.
Due to the linear structure of the economy, we consider linear projections
as forecasts, which are the (reduced form) conditional expectation in this kind
of setting. Consequently, since the conditional expectation leads to the fore-
cast with the smallest mean squared error, linear projections produce optimal
forecasts in this sense in such an environment. What remains to be speciﬁed
are the relevant variables on which to project. In this respect, we consider




t+1.8 In particular, both future ﬁscal shocks are relevant variables to produce
a forecast for both government expenditure and revenue despite the relative or-
dering assumption of the structural equations. To see why, lead the structural
equations (4) and (5) by one period and take expectations:
b gt+1 = α
g
cb ct+1 + v
g
t+1 (12)
b rt+1 = α
r







The only variable not known to the agent in period t is next period’s private
consumption. Consequently, leading equations (3) to (5) by one period, com-
bination, and taking expectations with respect to the information available at
time t, i.e., Υt  v
g
t+1, and vr


























where b b gt+2 = E(gt+2|Υt v
g
t+1 vr
t+1), b b rt+2 = E(rt+2|Υt v
g
t+1 vr
t+1), and note that
vc
t+1 is not known at time t. In order to infer expected future consumption
both expected future government expenditure and expected future government
revenue are relevant. Those, in turn, depend - among other things - on future
ﬁscal shocks as indicated by equations (12) and (13). Consequently, expected
future consumption is governed by both next period’s ﬁscal shocks. This, in
turn, implies that those shocks will be relevant when forming expectations
both with respect to government expenditure and government revenue, so that
8In this simpliﬁed setup, due to the absence of lagged endogenous variables, Υt is not
relevant for expectation formation. In the general case, however, Υt does play a role.
10the ordering concerning the shocks in equations (4) and (5) will not hold in
the expectational equations. Intuitively, the two ﬁscal shocks are useful for
estimating future private consumption, which in turn is relevant for forecasting
the ﬁscal variables.
Moreover, in this simpliﬁed setting we can easily combine the last three




































































This demonstrates the consistency of the expectational equations with the
equations describing the basic structure of the economy. In particular, the
linear projection coeﬃcients of equations (6) and (7) can be related to the
structural coeﬃcients of equations (3) to (5).
2.2 The general setting: estimating an expectation aug-
mented VAR
After having discussed the basic idea of our approach in the simpliﬁed setting,
we now turn to the general case and present our estimation procedure. Taking
into account lagged endogenous variables, the basic structure of the economy
is given by the following set of equations:
ct = C11(L)ct−1 + γ1b gt+1 + α
c
ggt + C12(L)gt−1 + γ2b rt+1
+α
c






















where we pulled ct−1 out of the lagpolynomial, since we have to treat the corre-
sponding coeﬃcients separately due to the identiﬁcation scheme of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002).
11The expectational equations in the general setup result as:




























Estimation of this model basically proceeds in three steps.9 First, we look
at the ﬁscal equations (18) and (19). Here we start by exploiting the assump-
tion concerning decision lags. In particular, in order to address endogeneity
issues, we use exogenous consumption elasticities of government expenditure
and revenue to compute adjusted real government direct expenditure and net
revenue.10 Furthermore, we not only have to assume that there is no ﬁscal
policy discretionary response to consumption developments within the quar-
ter but also no response to such developments in the previous quarter. This
indicates a tradeoﬀ inherent in our method. On the one hand, we are able to
incorporate ﬁscal foresight in the benchmark ﬁscal VAR model of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), but on the other we are constrained by the assumptions on
which this approach is based. In particular, the maximum anticipation horizon
we can implement depends on the number of periods we are willing to assume
that ﬁscal policy is not able to discretionarily respond to macroeconomic de-
velopments. This step leads to the following setup:
g
A





















Subsequently, we recursively estimate the resulting equations by OLS to obtain
the structural shocks to the respective ﬁscal variable, i.e., we ﬁrst estimate
9Here our focus is on the aspect of anticipation. A more detailed description of the
general estimation approach can be found in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Tenhofen,
Wolﬀ, and Heppke-Falk (2010).
10Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that ﬁscal policy decision making is a slow process,
involving many agents in parliament, government, and civil society. As a result, reactions
of ﬁscal policy to current developments only result from automatic responses. Those are
deﬁned by existing laws and regulations and can be taken into account by applying exogenous
output or consumption elasticities. Adjusting government expenditure or revenue using
these elasticities allows to obtain unbiased estimates of the structural coeﬃcients and thus
the structural ﬁscal policy shocks.
12equation (22) and obtain v
g
t, and then use this shock series as an additional
regressor to estimate equation (23).
In the second step, we consider the equation modeling private consumption.
We begin by rewriting equation (17) as follows:
ct = C11(L)ct−1 + γ1gt+1 + α
c
ggt + C12(L)gt−1 + γ2rt+1
+α
c
rrt + C13(L)rt−1 + v
c′
t   (24)
where



















t+1. Subsequently, equation (24) is
estimated by instrumental variables, in order to account for the correlation of
the respective regressors and error term. Since both vi
t+1 and vi
t (i = g r) are
perfectly known at time t, they are uncorrelated with the expectational errors
in vc′
t . Furthermore, because they are also uncorrelated with vc







t as instruments to estimate γ1, αc
g, γ2, and αc
r.
Finally, in the third step, we look at the equations modeling expectations.
Since, as mentioned above, with respect to these two equations we are only
interested in forecasting and not in estimation of the structural parameters,
it is suﬃcient to just plug equations (20) and (21) into equations (25) and
(26), respectively, and estimate these by OLS, as OLS provides a consistent
estimate of the linear projection coeﬃcient.11
Following this procedure, we obtain all coeﬃcients necessary to compute
the structural impulse response functions. In particular, it is possible to derive
the dynamic response to a perfectly anticipated ﬁscal policy shock.
3 Application to simulated data
In order to illustrate the ability of our approach to capture ﬁscal policy an-
ticipation, we apply this new empirical method to model-generated data. We
consider a stylized theoretical model featuring ﬁscal foresight to assess whether
11See, for example, Hamilton (1994, p. 76).
13our approach is able to address problems related to non-invertibility due to ﬁs-
cal policy anticipation. In particular, we use a variation of the model of Ramey
(2009), which is a standard neoclassical growth model, to simulate time series
and subsequently use these artiﬁcial data to estimate both a standard VAR
and our expectation augmented VAR to derive impulse response functions. A
convenient feature of simulating data from a theoretical model is that we know
the true impulse response function in this setup. Consequently, by comparing
the estimated impulse responses to the theoretical one, we can check whether
the two aforementioned VAR models are able to address anticipation eﬀects.
Ramey (2009) presents a simple neoclassical growth model featuring gov-
ernment spending ﬁnanced via nondistortionary taxes, where agents learn
about changes in government expenditure before their actual realization. We
take her setup as a starting point, but augment it with a few features to be
able to apply Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson’s
(2007) invertibility condition.12 As mentioned in the introduction, ﬁscal fore-
sight in a generic DSGE model may lead to an equilibrium process with a
non-invertible MA component, posing substantial problems for standard VAR
analysis.13 These problems can be illustrated as follows: in the case of non-
invertibility, the stochastic process does not possess a (VAR) representation
in current and past endogenous variables, as observed by the econometrician,
where the resulting innovations are called fundamental. For each non-invertible
process, however, there exists an invertible one, featuring the same mean and
autocovariance-generating function. This implies that these processes cannot
be distinguished based on the ﬁrst two moments, so that Gaussian likelihood
or least-squares procedures, for instance, run into an identiﬁcation problem.
As a result, it is standard in the VAR literature to disregard all non-invertible
representations and focus solely on the corresponding invertible process. This
means, however, that the econometrician is only able to recover the fundamen-
tal innovations corresponding to the invertible representation of the process,
whereas the true economic shocks might correspond to the non-fundamental
12Our model is still relatively close to Ramey’s (2009) original speciﬁcation. In particular,
in the two models the impulse responses which are at the center of our investigation, i.e.,
the ones with respect to a government spending shock, are quite similar.
13An MA process is called invertible, if all the roots of the corresponding characteristic
equation are outside the unit circle.
14innovations of a non-invertible process.14 As a result, standard tools based
on such VARs, like impulse response functions or variance decompositions,
potentially yield incorrect inferences.
In order to detect whether non-invertibility is present in a given DSGE
model, Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson (2007) de-
rive a condition based on the state-space representation of the equilibrium
process of an economic model:
xt+1 = Axt + Bwt+1 (27)
yt+1 = Cxt + Dwt+1  (28)
where xt is a vector of (possibly unobserved) state variables, yt is a vector of
variables the econometrician observes, and wt denotes the vector of economic
shocks. If “the eigenvalues of A − BD−1C are strictly less than one in modu-
lus,”15 a standard VAR will be able to recover the true economic shocks, wt.
Note, however, to be able to apply this condition, the matrix D has to be non-
singular. In particular, the matrix must be square, i.e., the number of variables
observed by the econometrician has to equal the number of economic shocks.
For many models, this will not be the case, and this prerequisite is not met
in Ramey’s (2009) original setup. Consequently, we add investment-speciﬁc
technology shocks and an error in forecasting government expenditure to the
model, to obtain a nonsingular matrix D.16 The latter feature is particularly
interesting for this exercise. It allows to vary the relative importance of antic-
ipated vs. unanticipated shocks to government expenditure. In particular, the
model is able to represent a setting where foresight is not perfect.
With respect to the economic environment of the model, preferences and
technology are speciﬁed as follows: the representative household maximizes
14Please note, that in this description, we use a relation between (non-)invertibility and
(non-)fundamentalness which abstracts from the borderline case, when at least one root of
the characteristic equation of the moving-average process is on the unit circle (and none
inside). Then, the process is non-invertible but the innovations are said to be fundamental.
15CONDITION 1 in Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson (2007,
p. 1022).
16Going back to Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988), investment-speciﬁc tech-
nology shocks are considered to be a major source of economic growth as well as business
cycle ﬂuctuations. With respect to the former, see for example Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell (1997), whereas the latter point is made, for instance, by Greenwood, Hercowitz,
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where β is the household’s discount factor, Ct is private consumption, and Lt
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where Yt is output, Nt denotes labor input, and Kt is the capital stock, which
evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + XtIt  (31)
In the latter equation, It denotes (gross) investment, Xt is the level of
investment-speciﬁc technology, and δ is the rate of depreciation for capital.17
The two resource constraints in this economy are given by
Lt + Nt ≤ 1 (32)
Ct + It + Gt ≤ Yt  (33)
The stochastic processes governing the shocks to technology, the marginal
rate of substitution, and investment-speciﬁc technology are assumed to evolve
according to
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Finally, the evolution of government spending, ﬁnanced via non-distortionary
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17This way of introducing investment-speciﬁc technological change follows Fisher (2006).
16where Gt is actual government spending at time t, G
F j
t is the j-period forecast
of government spending made at time t, and EG
t is the error made in forecasting
government expenditure. Alternatively and perhaps more intuitively, one can
think of government expenditure as following an AR(3) process, where the
error consists of an anticipated and an unanticipated part:
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Combining such a speciﬁcation with the forecasting relation (37) and the pro-
cess for the forecast error (39) yields equation (38). The anticipated part of the
error is known j periods in advance. Consequently, the preceding equations
imply j-period imperfect foresight with respect to government expenditure
shocks. In the following exercise, j is set to 1, corresponding to the speciﬁ-
cation in our empirical application in the next section.18 This setup is quite
convenient in the sense, that by varying the variances of the anticipated and
unanticipated shock, eGF
t and eEG
t , respectively, it is possible to vary the rela-
tive importance of the two shocks for government expenditure. As σ2
eEG tends
to zero, we approach a case of j-period perfect foresight, whereas when σ2
eGF
goes to zero, ﬁscal foresight will vanish. Furthermore, Ramey (2009) intro-
duces measurement error in the logarithm of output, governed by an AR(1)
process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρ4 and variance σ2
em.
With respect to the calibration of the model, the same parameters are cho-
sen as in Ramey (2009), where one time period in the model corresponds to a
quarter. The calibration of the stochastic process for investment-speciﬁc tech-
nology, which is not present in Ramey’s (2009) original model, is taken from In
and Yoon (2007). These authors estimate this process for quarterly data, fol-
lowing an approach introduced by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997,
2000), where the latter use annual data. Furthermore, we distribute the vari-
ance of the government expenditure shock given by Ramey (2009) among the
anticipated and unanticipated part. In our benchmark calibration, we choose
the same value for the standard deviation of the forecast error with respect to
18This is an additional slight deviation from Ramey’s (2009) original model, where she
introduces two periods of foresight. Our estimation approach could also accommodate such
a setting, but we want to be consistent with the informational assumptions employed in our
subsequent empirical investigation.
17Table 1: Calibration
Symbol Value Symbol Value Symbol Value Symbol Value
β 0.99 ρ2 0.95 σeψ 0.008 σem 0.005
α 0.33 ρ3 0.95 σex 0.012 d1 1.4
δ 0.023 ρ4 0.95 σeGF 0.0275 d2 -0.18
ρ1 0.95 σeZ 0.01 σeEG 0.005 d3 -0.25
government spending as for the standard deviation of the measurement error in
output. All in all, the values chosen are standard and summarized in Table 1.
Based on this calibration, we compute the eigenvalues of the matrix men-
tioned in Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram´ ırez, Sargent, and Watson’s (2007)
invertibility condition. In this way we can check, whether the equilibrium
process of the model just presented features a non-invertible moving-average
component. Indeed, two eigenvalues are larger than one in modulus, implying
that a standard VAR will not be able to recover the true economic shocks from
current and past endogenous variables.19 Even though we know, that the eco-
nomic shocks cannot be exactly recovered from the observed current and past
endogenous variables used in a VAR, it is still possible that (a subset of) those
shocks can be reconstructed with relatively high accuracy. This point is made
by Sims and Zha (2006) and demonstrated for a particular DSGE model. Since
we are primarily interested in impulse response functions, in the following we
check the actual severity of the invertibility problem introduced by ﬁscal fore-
sight, by comparing the theoretical impulses responses to the estimated ones
obtained from a standard VAR using Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) identiﬁca-
tion scheme. Furthermore, by computing the corresponding impulse responses
using our expectation augmented VAR, we can examine whether our approach
is able to align the information sets of the agents and econometrician and can
cope with the more demanding informational setup introduced by anticipation
of ﬁscal policy.
Taking the theoretical impulse responses as a reference point, we simulate
time series of 100 observations from the setup described above and subse-
quently employ these artiﬁcial data in the estimation of a standard VAR and
an expectation augmented VAR. Since our main focus is on the consumption
response to an anticipated government spending shock, we concentrate on bi-
19For this model, the eigenvalues of the matrix A − BD−1C in modulus are as follows:
1.6245, 1.6245, 0.9977, 0.7442, 0.7442, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.
18variate VARs in consumption and actual government expenditure while solely
plotting the impulse response for consumption with respect to a shock to the
latter variable. In the standard VAR, we use a Cholesky decomposition to
identify the structural shocks, where government spending is ordered ﬁrst. In
this simpliﬁed setting, this amounts to the identiﬁcation scheme of Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), where the consumption elasticity of government spend-
ing is assumed to be zero contemporaneously. Concerning the expectation
augmented VAR, we proceed as described in the previous section. In both
cases, we include a constant and four lags of the endogenous variables in the
estimation.20
The results are presented in Figure 2. Each graph plots the response of
consumption to a one standard deviation anticipated or unanticipated shock
to government expenditure over a horizon of 20 periods. In the theoretical
model, the response to both of those shocks is qualitatively the same. Con-
sequently, and since our main focus is on the issue of ﬁscal foresight, we just
show the theoretical impulse response resulting from the model for the antic-
ipated shock to government expenditure, displayed in the ﬁrst graph of the
ﬁgure. The remaining plots show the corresponding impulse response function
for the standard and expectation augmented VAR, respectively. In addition,
the latter two graphs also display 68% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals.21 The
timeline is normalized in such a way, that period 0 corresponds to the point
in time when there is the actual change in government spending, potentially
coinciding with an unanticipated shock to government expenditure. The start-
ing point, however, is period -1, when in the theoretical model, which governs
the data generating process, the news about an increase in government ex-
penditure arrives. This corresponds to the anticipated government spending
shock.22
In the theoretical model, even though government spending does not move
20This follows the speciﬁcation of Ramey (2009). In her paper, she performs a similar
exercise, in order to stress the importance of timing in a VAR. In particular, she compares
two recursively identiﬁed VARs, where in the ﬁrst estimation she uses actual government
expenditure, Gt, and in the second one the forecast of that variable, G
F j
t .
21In this regard, we follow the literature on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks. See, for
example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Ramey (2009).
22The remaining theoretical impulse responses corresponding to a government expenditure
shock are presented in Figure A-1 in the appendix. Note in particular, that all variables
except government spending, of course, move immediately when the news about the shock
arrives.





















Figure 2: Theoretical and VAR impulse responses of consumption to a one
standard deviation shock to government spending as well as 68% bootstrap
conﬁdence intervals.
until period 0, consumption reacts immediately upon arrival of the news, i.e.,
in period -1. Due to the negative wealth eﬀect, consumption drops on impact
followed by a slow increase. Such a response, however, does not result when
estimating a standard VAR and employing the well-established identiﬁcation
approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). In particular note, that this con-
clusion is unaltered if instead an unanticipated government expenditure shock
is considered, since the dynamic response in the theoretical model is qualita-
tively the same for both of those shocks.23 The consumption response for the
standard VAR is insigniﬁcant over the entire horizon, while the point estimate
is basically zero on impact and then somewhat decreases. Such a result is in
23The latter comparison might be more appropriate, as a standard VAR is only able to
identify a government spending shock which immediately leads to a change in government
expenditure. The arrival of the news in this setup coincides with the actual change in the
ﬁscal variable. Consequently, the impulse response of consumption in this case starts at
period 0.
20line with typical ﬁndings of the VAR approach concerning the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy shocks. In this model, problems related to non-invertibility due to ﬁscal
policy anticipation do not seem to be only a theoretical feature of the data,
but have important consequences for empirical research. Reﬂecting Ramey’s
(2009) argument, when using standard VAR techniques, structural shocks are
not identiﬁed correctly, invalidating the structural analysis in a qualitatively
and quantitatively important way.24
Our expectation augmented VAR, on the other hand, seems to be able to
align the information sets of the private agents and the econometrician. It
correctly captures the response of consumption to the anticipated government
spending shock (third graph of Figure 2), even in the case when foresight is
not perfect but obscured by unanticipated ﬁscal shocks. Not only the sign and
subsequent qualitative movement of consumption corresponds to the true re-
sponse derived from the model, but also the estimated impulse response is very
close to the theoretical one. The estimated impact response is -0.022 compared
to -0.024 in the theoretical model. Moreover, a conventional 95 % conﬁdence
band includes the true impulse response for the entire horizon considered.
Overall, our expectation augmented VAR thus correctly captures the eﬀects
of an anticipated ﬁscal shock. It addresses the more complex informational
structure of anticipated shocks within a VAR framework and delivers results
closely matching the theoretical impulse responses. Opposed to standard ap-
proaches, it thus correctly takes into account the informational setup of the
underlying data generating process, thereby rendering valid structural analy-
sis feasible. In the next section, we apply our expectation augmented VAR to
real-life data in order to investigate the impact of ﬁscal policy anticipation on
the consumption response to a shock to total government expenditure and its
subcomponents.
24As expected, these problems become less severe when the importance of unanticipated
relative to anticipated government spending shocks is increased. Reducing the importance
of ﬁscal foresight yields impulse responses for a standard VAR which are quite close to the
theoretical ones.
214 Empirical investigation
4.1 Data and elasticities
With respect to the data of our empirical investigation, real private consump-
tion, real GDP, as well as real government direct expenditure, and real govern-
ment net revenue for the US are deﬁned as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).25
The series are seasonally adjusted, in per capita terms, and we take logs. The
frequency of the employed time series is crucial for the identiﬁcation approach.
In order to exclude the possibility of discretionary ﬁscal policy actions within
one time period, quarterly data are used. The system is estimated in levels
including a constant, a time trend, and a dummy to account for the large
tax cut in 1975:2. The sample starts in 1947:1 and runs up to 2009:2. The
number of lags for the VAR is chosen to be three as suggested by the Akaike
information criterion (AIC). With respect to the output and consumption elas-
ticities, we follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and assume that there is no
automatic response of government spending in the current and the previous
quarter, and that the consumption elasticities of net revenue are 2 08 ∗0 6468
and 0 16 ∗ 0 6468 for time t and t − 1, respectively, where 2 08 and 0 16 are
the output elasticities and 0 6468 is the average share of consumption in GDP
over the sample period. We perform various robustness checks concerning
these elasticities without any substantial change in results.26
4.2 Total government expenditure
The starting point of our empirical investigation is a VAR ` a la Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), featuring highly aggregated ﬁscal variables. In order to
investigate Ramey’s (2009) hypothesis, that when ﬁscal policy anticipation
is properly taken into account, the positive consumption response typically
found in VAR studies will turn negative, our VAR models include real pri-
vate consumption, real direct expenditure, and real net revenue as endogenous
25Figures A-2 and A-3 in the appendix plot the expenditure and tax to GDP ratio, re-
spectively, as shown in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The data are taken from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis website (www.bea.gov).
26In particular, as do Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we also set the output elasticity of
net revenue at t − 1 to 0 and 0 5, and consequently the consumption elasticity to 0 and
0 5 ∗ 0 6468; see Section 5.
22variables. In Figures 3 and 4, we present the responses of private consump-
tion to a shock to government spending derived from a standard VAR and our
expectation augmented VAR, respectively.27 Both of those responses are basi-
cally insigniﬁcant. In the model which is not taking into account anticipation,
however, consumption turns positive after the ninth quarter. Of course, the
insigniﬁcant response stands somewhat in contrast to the paper by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). It should be noted, however, that we show the eﬀect on
private consumption, not GDP. Moreover, the respective sample periods under
consideration are diﬀerent. Whereas Blanchard and Perotti (2002) base their
results on the sample 1960:1 – 1997:4, we not only use data also from the
ﬁrst decade of the new century but in addition include the 1950s. The latter
period might be important, which we will discuss below. The main point,
though, to be taken from this ﬁrst set of results, is that at least at this highly
aggregated level, taking into account anticipation issues does not overturn the
results obtained from a standard VAR.






Govt. E on C
Figure 3: Reaction of private consumption to government expenditure shock.
Standard SVAR model without anticipation. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.
When considering a variable like real government direct expenditure, how-
ever, we are lumping together the diﬀerent subcomponents of this variable,
which could have very diﬀerent eﬀects on private consumption. For example,
expenditure on education might have a diﬀerent eﬀect on economic activity
than defense expenditure. Indeed, the crucial feature of models ` a la Baxter
and King (1993) to generate a negative consumption response to an increase
27We plot the point estimate of the impulse response function as well as 68% bootstrap
conﬁdence bands based on 5000 replications. We show 68% conﬁdence intervals to be com-
parable to the literature, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Ramey (2009). Moreover,
the corresponding impulse response functions with respect to a shock to government revenue
for the current and following speciﬁcations can be found in the appendix.










Govt. exp. E on C
Figure 4: Reaction of private consumption to anticipated government expen-
diture shock. The shock occurs in period 0 and is anticipated in period -1.
Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.
in government expenditure is, that the latter represents a withdrawal of re-
sources from the economy, which does not substitute or complement private
consumption nor contributes to production. Thus, even though government
spending might aﬀect utility, it does not inﬂuence private decisions except
through the budget constraint. However, Baxter and King (1993) show that
once government expenditure enters the production function, for example, an
increase in this kind of spending can have very expansionary eﬀects depend-
ing on the productivity of the good. Consequently, already in the framework
of this model, we might expect public expenditure on non-defense items like
education, infrastructure, or law enforcement, which probably contribute to
aggregate productivity, to induce an increase in private consumption. Public
spending on national defense, on the other hand, lacking any complementarity
or substitutability with respect to private consumption or any contribution
to the private production process, might lead to the opposite response.28 In
fact, a change in defense spending is probably the closest approximation to the
standard policy experiment conducted in models like Baxter and King (1993),
i.e., a setup where in particular unproductive government expenditure are con-
sidered. But when we combine those defense and non-defense items in a single
variable and study its dynamic eﬀects on private consumption, the respective
individual responses might cancel and lead to such weak results as reported
28Following the same reasoning, Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) in their theoretical investi-
gation of the macroeconomic eﬀects of subcomponents of government spending, distinguish
“government consumption expenditure” and “government infrastructure expenditure.” The
former includes items like national defense or social programs, whereas the latter consists of
spending on roads, education, and job training, for example.
24above.
Consequently, in order to avoid this blurring of results, we focus in the fol-
lowing on diﬀerent subcomponents of government spending. In particular, we
distinguish defense and non-defense expenditure. Considering defense spend-
ing is, of course, similar in spirit to Ramey’s (2009) exercise of using dummy
variables or other more sophisticated measures to capture large increases in
government spending related to wars. Thus, we are able to check whether
we can replicate Ramey’s (2009) ﬁndings in an SVAR-based framework, when
taking into account anticipation issues. Our method, however, is not conﬁned
to defense spending, so that we can also investigate the role of ﬁscal foresight
when considering non-defense items of government expenditure.29
4.3 Defense expenditure
But ﬁrst, we look at public expenditure on national defense, which exhibits
some noticeable features, particularly compared to non-defense spending. Ma-
jor movements in total US government expenditure since the 1950s are related
to defense spending. Figure 5 shows that while real non-defense expenditure
per capita has increased substantially, the increase is rather smooth and fol-
lows GDP growth. In contrast, defense spending moved considerably and is
rather volatile reﬂecting the diﬀerent engagements of the USA in international
wars. Most notably, the 1950s are characterized by a strong increase in de-
fense expenditure, mainly due to the Korean War build-up. As depicted in
Figure 6, this military engagement, along with increased defense spending due
to the cold war, led to an increase of the ratio of defense expenditure to GDP
from less than 7 percent in 1948 to almost 15 percent in 1952.30 Moreover, the
29We distinguish defense and non-defense spending and interpret them in terms of their
respective degree of substitutability or complementarity or degree of productivity in the
private production process in the spirit of Baxter and King (1993) and Turnovsky and
Fisher (1995). Another strand of the literature highlights the importance of breaking total
government spending down into purchases of goods and services and compensation of public
employees (Rotemberg and Woodford 1992, Finn 1998, Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa 2009,
Gomes 2009). Our focus, however, is on the diﬀerent results of the narrative and SVAR
approaches concerning the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy and we therefore highlight defense and
non-defense expenditure as subcomponents of total government spending.
30Concerning the choice of the sample period, we follow Ramey’s (2008) argument and do
not disregard the 1950s – including the Korean War – in the subsequent estimations. The
Korean War, she forcefully argues, is an important source of variation in the data and should
not be ignored. She notes that “[e]liminating the Korean War period from a study of the
25correlation between the detrended series of total government spending and de-
fense spending is 0 81, whereas it is only 0 39 for total government expenditure
and non-defense spending.
















Figure 5: Real per capita govern-
ment spending.









Figure 6: Ratio of defense expendi-
ture to GDP.
Turning to the estimation results, Figure 7 shows the response of consump-
tion to a shock to defense spending derived from a standard ﬁscal VAR in the
spirit of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Compared to the dynamic response to a
shock to total government spending, the point estimate shifts markedly down-
wards, in line with our expectations derived from economic theory. However,
it is mostly insigniﬁcant except for periods 3-5. In particular, the point esti-
mate on impact is zero and not signiﬁcant. A very diﬀerent picture emerges,
when the VAR is augmented with our new methodology to account for antic-
ipation eﬀects, depicted in Figure 8. The dynamic response of consumption
is unambiguously negative over the entire horizon. In particular, we ﬁnd that
consumption falls on impact with a subsequent slow increase, exactly in line
with standard economic models. Even though defense spending does not move
before period 0, the private agents respond immediately when they learn about
the shock, which occurs in period -1.
Thus, we can reconcile the narrative and SVAR approaches by replicat-
ing Ramey’s (2009) ﬁndings in an SVAR-based framework. Our results are
furthermore in line with Ramey’s (2009) hypothesis, that the diﬀerence be-
tween those two approaches arises because standard VAR techniques fail to
allow for anticipation issues. In order to see those eﬀects clearly, however, it
eﬀects of government spending shocks makes as much sense as eliminating the 1990s from
a study of the eﬀects of information technology.” Not surprisingly, when disregarding the
important period 1947-1959 in the following estimation, we obtain weaker results (Figures
A-6 and A-7 in the appendix).









Govt. def E on C
Figure 7: Reaction of private consumption to government defense expenditure
shock. Standard SVAR model without anticipation. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.












Govt. exp. def E on C
Figure 8: Reaction of private consumption to anticipated government defense
expenditure shock. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.
is necessary to look at more disaggregated variables to avoid interferences due
to potentially diﬀerent dynamic responses to other items of total government
expenditure. All in all, our results underscore the need to appropriately take
into account ﬁscal foresight in empirical research.
We can also look at these results from the viewpoint of the problems related
to the misalignment of information sets of private agents and the econometri-
cian due to ﬁscal policy anticipation. In those settings, even though we cannot
obtain the true structural shocks from current and past endogenous variables,
the system is invertible in current and future variables. Thus, as pointed out by
Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009), for example, it is possible to understand the
two aforementioned approaches within the single framework of ﬁnding instru-
ments for future variables. In this regard, it is encouraging that two diﬀerent
approaches of tackling those problems, in particular two diﬀerent sets of in-
struments - “war dummies” on the one hand and future identiﬁed shocks to
defense spending on the other - yield very similar results.
274.4 Non-defense expenditure
Next, we move to non-defense spending. As explained at the beginning of this
section, we might expect private consumption to react diﬀerently to rather
wasteful defense and potentially productive non-defense expenditure. Since
private agents reoptimize and thus respond to new information as soon as
it arrives regardless of whether it concerns defense or non-defense items of
government spending, ﬁscal foresight is not conﬁned to changes in the former
variable. Thus, we move beyond Ramey’s (2009) exercise and take advantage
of the ﬂexibility of our econometric approach, and investigate the consequences
of ﬁscal policy anticipation for dynamic responses to non-defense expenditure.
In Figure 9, we plot the impulse-response function of private consumption
to a shock to government expenditure, where the latter does not include de-
fense spending. It is derived from a three variable VAR estimated over the
entire sample period without taking into account anticipation. In this stan-
dard framework, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive consumption response after 6
quarters. Thus, the dynamics move broadly in the direction implied by eco-
nomic theory. The point estimate, however, is still basically zero on impact
and insigniﬁcant, and it takes a couple of quarters for the response to move sig-
niﬁcantly into positive territory. As Figure 10 makes clear, extending the VAR








Govt. nonD E on C
Figure 9: Reaction of private consumption to government non-defense expen-
diture shock. Standard SVAR model without anticipation. Sample: 1947q1-
2009q2.
to allow for anticipation of ﬁscal shocks yields a diﬀerent picture. We now ﬁnd
a signiﬁcantly positive consumption response already in period -1, when the
increase in non-defense expenditure is anticipated. Furthermore, the response
stays signiﬁcantly positive over the entire horizon under consideration, where
28after a peak in period 1 it declines steadily.










Govt. exp. nonD E on C
Figure 10: Reaction of private consumption to anticipated government non-
defense expenditure shock. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.
Analogous to the results obtained for defense spending, anticipation eﬀects
are also of empirical relevance when considering non-defense expenditure. This
ﬁnding is in line with Ramey’s (2009) overall argument, even though we ob-
tain a signiﬁcant increase in private consumption. Thus, it is important to
distinguish the potentially diﬀerent dynamic responses to the separate sub-
components of total government expenditure.
An unambiguously positive consumption response would be expected when
considering the model of Baxter and King (1993) for the case of productive
government expenditure, for example.31 Given the opposite ﬁndings for defense
and non-defense expenditure, the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy when lumping together
those two items in one ﬁscal aggregate are likely to be weak.
As a ﬁnal analysis of this section, we take up another point made by Ramey
(2009). She argues that aggregate VARs are not very good at capturing shocks
to spending which is determined locally. Consequently, in order to make sure
that our ﬁndings are not driven by the fact that large parts of non-defense
expenditure are made by states and local authorities, we look at federal non-
defense consumption spending.32 As depicted in Figures 11 and 12, we ﬁnd our
previous results conﬁrmed. In particular, the consumption response derived
from our expectation augmented VAR is again signiﬁcantly positive on impact
and over the entire horizon. But also the dynamic response based on a standard
31Of course, this result is also in line with the model of Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es
(2007), so that this particular set of impulse response functions is not particularly helpful
in guiding modeling eﬀorts.
32Please note, that since state and local governments do not have expenditure on national
defense, federal defense spending equals total defense spending.
29VAR is very similar. These results suggest that the diﬀerence between defense
and non-defense spending is not determined by the fact that large parts of
non-defense spending are made by states and local authorities.
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Figure 11: Reaction of private consumption to federal non-defense expenditure
shock. Standard SVAR model without anticipation. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.







Fed. exp. nonD C on C
Figure 12: Reaction of private consumption to anticipated federal non-defense
expenditure shock. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.
All in all, our ﬁndings highlight the importance of taking into account ﬁs-
cal foresight when studying empirically the dynamic eﬀects of changes in ﬁscal
policy on economic activity. Our results are in line with Ramey’s (2009) hy-
pothesis, that standard VARs fail to take into account anticipation issues and
therefore yield incorrect inferences. Motivated by economic theory, we empha-
size the need to look at diﬀerent subcomponents of total government spending
and show with our ﬂexible approach that they have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
macroeconomy. Lumping together the diﬀerent items in a single ﬁscal aggre-
gate blurs the results. For defense spending, we are able to replicate Ramey’s
(2009) ﬁndings of a decrease in private consumption in an SVAR-based frame-
work and can thereby reconcile the narrative and SVAR approaches of studying
30the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. For non-defense spending, we also ﬁnd an impor-
tant role for ﬁscal policy anticipation, but in this case private consumption
increases signiﬁcantly. This result is exactly what would be expected when
considering standard neoclassical or New-Keynesian models of ﬁscal policy for
the case of productive public expenditure, for example.
Our ﬁndings also correspond to the results of the very recent papers by
Kriwoluzky (2009) and Mertens and Ravn (2009). These authors also study the
eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight on the dynamic responses to government expenditure
shocks.33 Neither paper, however, looks at subcomponents of total government
spending. By distinguishing defense and non-defense spending, we can put
their ﬁndings into perspective and also qualify the result in an earlier version
of this paper of a negative consumption response in an expectation augmented
VAR (Tenhofen and Wolﬀ 2007). For instance, similar to our ﬁnding for the
consumption response to total government expenditure, Kriwoluzky (2009)
also obtains a rather weak response in the ﬁrst couple of quarters. Mertens
and Ravn (2009), on the other hand, conclude based on their results that
anticipation of ﬁscal policy does not alter the positive eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
on consumption and output. Finally, from the viewpoint of the problems
related to the misalignment of information sets due to ﬁscal foresight, we ﬁnd
encouraging that diﬀerent approaches of tackling these problems, in particular
diﬀerent sets of instruments, yield basically the same results. In the next
section, we turn to the robustness of our ﬁndings.
5 Robustness checks
First, we want to make sure that our results are not driven by the omission
of other, potentially important macroeconomic variables. In particular, we
consider adding measures of real output and/or a short-term interest rate to
the speciﬁcations mentioned above.
With respect to the latter variable, while Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
also do not control for short-term interest rates, follow-up papers by Perotti
add such a variable to a standard ﬁscal SVAR. Since monetary policy is not
33The former employs sign restrictions derived from a DSGE model to identify the struc-
tural shocks of a vector MA (VMA) model estimated by likelihood methods. The latter
consider a vector error-correction model (VECM) and use Blaschke matrices as suggested
by Lippi and Reichlin (1993, 1994) to obtain non-fundamental innovations.
31orthogonal to ﬁscal policy, its inclusion might alter our results. We therefore
extend our SVAR approach to also feature a short-term interest rate. In partic-
ular, following Giordano, Momigliano, Neri, and Perotti (2007) and Tenhofen,
Wolﬀ, and Heppke-Falk (2010), we assume a recursive ordering for the equa-
tions of the non-ﬁscal variables. Accordingly, whereas consumption is assumed
not to react to the short-term interest rate contemporaneously, this is not true
vice versa. This ordering assumption, reﬂecting the more sluggish nature of
consumption compared to ﬁnancial variables like interest rates, is common
practice in the monetary VAR literature. Furthermore, when estimating the
interest-rate equation, we have to add to the set of instruments the structural
shock to consumption, vc
t, obtained from the consumption equation, in order
to get unbiased estimates. Apart from that, the additional equation for the
interest rate also includes expectation terms of the ﬁscal variables, in order to
be consistent with our assumption of ﬁscal policy anticipation.34
With respect to data, in our estimation we use the 3-month T-bill rate.35
Concerning the (semi-)elasticities, we follow Perotti (2005) in assuming that
government spending does not react to changes in the interest rate in the
current and also in the previous quarter. Indeed, the government spending
variable does not include interest payments. Regarding the impact on revenue,
we also follow Perotti (2005) and assume no contemporaneous response, but
also no response to movements in the interest rate in period t−1. However, we
checked robustness of the results to changes in these elasticities. Our ﬁndings
are not altered in substance and available from the authors.
Figures 13 and 14 show the results for a defense expenditure shock once the
respective speciﬁcation is extended to control for the 3-month T-bill rate. As in
the benchmark case, we ﬁnd consumption to fall on impact in our expectation
augmented SVAR, while in the case of the standard SVAR it is insigniﬁcant
on impact. Furthermore, the resulting impulse responses are quite similar to
the ones arising in the corresponding three-variable benchmark case. Thus, the
inclusion of an interest rate does not signiﬁcantly alter the eﬀects of government
defense spending on private consumption.
34For more details on the estimation when the block of non-ﬁscal variables includes more
than one variable, see Giordano, Momigliano, Neri, and Perotti (2007) and Tenhofen, Wolﬀ,
and Heppke-Falk (2010).
35The corresponding time series is taken from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.










Govt. def E on C
Figure 13: Reaction of private consumption to government defense expenditure
shock. Standard SVAR model without anticipation. VAR includes 3-month
T-bill rate. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.







Govt. exp. def E on C
Figure 14: Reaction of private consumption to anticipated government de-
fense expenditure shock. VAR includes 3-month T-bill rate. Sample: 1947q1-
2009q2.
Next, we consider the eﬀects of including real GDP in addition to the
3-month T-bill rate and the three variables of our speciﬁcation focusing on de-
fense spending, i.e., real private consumption, real government defense expen-
diture, as well as real government net revenue. GDP and private consumption
are two closely linked variables. The SVAR approach up to now did not control
for the developments of the former variable. It is therefore possible that our
results are spuriously driven by the omission of this important determinant of
private consumption as well as of government activity. We therefore extend
the speciﬁcation of the preceding paragraph to also control for real GDP per
capita. This extension is analogous to the one just discussed, where we assume
that output does not react contemporaneously to consumption and the short-
33term interest rate, whereas consumption does react to developments in output
within the same period, but not to movements in the interest rate. The latter
variable, in turn, is considered to be the least sluggish one among the non-
ﬁscal variables, so that it is assumed to react to both output and consumption
contemporaneously.36 Whereas the assumption with respect to the interest
rate is probably uncontroversial, the ordering of the other two variables might
be less so. Consequently, in order to check the robustness of our ﬁndings, we
changed the ordering of output and consumption in our estimation. However,
this does not aﬀect our results. As already indicated in Section 4, with respect
to the output elasticities, we assume the same values as in Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002), which are furthermore in line with our assumptions concerning the
consumption elasticities.
Considering Figure 15, we indeed ﬁnd, in line with standard economic the-
ory as well as our previous results, that shocks to government defense expendi-
ture lead to a decrease in private consumption in our expectation augmented
VAR, even when controlling for output per capita, where the consumption re-
sponse is also quantitatively of similar size. Thus, the inclusion of GDP does
not aﬀect our main results.37












Govt. exp. def E on C
Figure 15: Reaction of private consumption to anticipated government defense
expenditure shock. VAR includes GDP and 3-month T-bill rate. Sample:
1947q1-2009q2.
When looking at non-defense expenditure, we also ﬁnd our main results
36Note, that in the estimation of the consumption equation, we have to extend the set of
instruments to include the structural shock to output, v
y
t . When estimating the interest-rate
equation, we furthermore have to add the structural shock to consumption, vc
t.
37The corresponding graph for the standard ﬁscal VAR is also basically unchanged and
given in the appendix (Figure A-16).
34conﬁrmed (Figures 16 to 18).38 The inclusion of a short-term interest rate or
GDP does not alter the previous ﬁndings. Consumption increases, in particular
on impact, in response to a non-defense spending shock in our expectation
augmented VAR. In the standard VAR, on the other hand, consumption only
increases after a couple of periods and the point estimate is basically zero on
impact and insigniﬁcant.






Govt. nonD E on C
Figure 16: Reaction of private consumption to government non-defense ex-
penditure shock. Standard SVAR model without anticipation. VAR includes
3-month T-bill rate. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.








Govt. exp. nonD E on C
Figure 17: Reaction of private consumption to anticipated government non-
defense expenditure shock. VAR includes 3-month T-bill rate. Sample:
1947q1-2009q2.
Our ﬁnal robustness check focuses on the elasticities. First, in our speci-
ﬁcation featuring defense expenditure, we set the elasticity of revenue to pri-
vate consumption at t − 1 to zero. Figure A-18 in the appendix shows that
the negative consumption response is unaﬀected. Increasing this elasticity to
38The graph concerning the standard VAR when including real GDP as well as a short-
term interest rate is again given in the appendix (Figure A-17).







Govt. exp. nonD E on C
Figure 18: Reaction of private consumption to anticipated government non-
defense expenditure shock. VAR includes GDP and 3-month T-bill rate. Sam-
ple: 1947q1-2009q2.
(0 5 ∗ 0 6468) yields Figure A-19, where the response to a shock to defense
spending also remains negative and signiﬁcant. Next, when doing the same
exercise based on our speciﬁcation featuring non-defense expenditure, we also
ﬁnd our previous results conﬁrmed. Regardless whether we use an elasticity
of revenue to private consumption at t − 1 of zero or (0 5 ∗ 0 6468), private
consumption increases signiﬁcantly on impact and over the entire horizon con-
sidered (Figures A-20 and A-21 in the appendix). Furthermore, using the tax
revenue elasticity to GDP as the elasticity of tax revenue to consumption does
not change the results (Figures A-22 to A-25 in the appendix). All in all, even
when adding macroeconomic variables to the system or when changing the ex-
ogenous elasticities needed to identify the SVAR, we clearly ﬁnd our previous
ﬁndings conﬁrmed.
6 Conclusions
How does private consumption react to public expenditure shocks? In this pa-
per, we develop a new SVAR approach which allows for anticipation of ﬁscal
policy shocks. Our goal is to avoid problems encountered by standard VARs
and align the information sets of the private agents and the econometrician,
which makes valid structural analysis feasible. We are able to exactly capture
a situation, where private agents perfectly know ﬁscal shocks one period in ad-
vance. Even though our method is not general in the sense of being applicable
in the presence of all possible kinds of information ﬂows, the ﬁndings of our
simulation exercise document that our approach is robust to situations with a
36potentially diﬀerent information structure. When confronted with data simu-
lated from a model featuring ﬁscal foresight and an equilibrium process with
a non-invertible MA component, our new method correctly captures macroe-
conomic dynamics. In contrast, standard VARs do not capture the dynamics
properly. This performance is even more noticeable as our economic model fea-
tures both anticipated and unanticipated ﬁscal shocks, so that private agents
only have imperfect foresight, which makes it more diﬃcult for our method to
trace out the individual dynamic eﬀects.
The empirical investigation highlights the importance of taking into ac-
count anticipation issues in ﬁscal VAR studies. In contrast to the rather weak
and mostly insigniﬁcant consumption responses in a standard VAR in the
spirit of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), our expectation augmented VAR yields
unambiguous responses. In this regard, we show that it is important to distin-
guish subcomponents of total government spending, which might have diﬀerent
eﬀects on the macroeconomy. This focus on more disaggregated variables is fa-
cilitated by the ﬂexibility of our econometric approach and allows us to qualify
recent ﬁndings in the literature. Considering total government expenditure,
on the other hand, does not yield clear-cut results. This is due to the fact
that when considering this aggregate, we lump together subcomponents with
potentially diﬀerent eﬀects on the macroeconomy.
The response of private consumption to a shock to defense spending in
our expectation augmented VAR corresponds to Ramey’s (2009) ﬁnding of a
negative consumption response. Thus, we are able to reconcile the narrative
and SVAR approaches of studying the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Non-defense
spending, on the other hand, yields a signiﬁcantly positive response of private
consumption. All in all, our ﬁndings are in line with Ramey’s (2009) overall
argument, that standard VAR techniques fail to allow for anticipation issues
which invalidates the structural analysis. Moreover, the results reported for
the expectation augmented VAR are what would be expected when considering
standard macroeconomic models for diﬀerent degrees of productivity of public
expenditure. Defense and non-defense spending are very diﬀerent in nature,
where the latter has a more productive character.
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Figure A-1: Theoretical impulse responses to a one standard deviation antici-
pated shock to government spending.








Figure A-2: Government direct ex-
penditure to GDP ratio.









Figure A-3: Government net rev-
enue to GDP ratio.












Govt. R on C
Figure A-4: Reaction of private
consumption to government rev-
enue shock. Standard SVAR model
without anticipation. Sample:
1947q1-2009q2.








Govt. exp. R on C
Figure A-5: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated gov-
ernment revenue shock. Sample:
1947q1-2009q2.










Govt. def E on C
Figure A-6: Reaction of private
consumption to government de-
fense expenditure shock. Standard
SVAR model without anticipation.
Sample: 1960q1-2009q2.







Govt. exp. def E on C
Figure A-7: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated govern-
ment defense expenditure shock.
Sample: 1960q1-2009q2.











Govt. R on C
Figure A-8: Reaction of private
consumption to government rev-
enue shock. Standard SVAR
model without anticipation. Sam-
ple: 1947q1-2009q2, model includ-
ing defense spending.








Govt. exp. R on C
Figure A-9: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated gov-
ernment revenue shock. Sam-
ple: 1947q1-2009q2, model includ-
ing defense spending.







Govt. R on C
Figure A-10: Reaction of pri-
vate consumption to government
revenue shock. Standard SVAR
model without anticipation. Sam-
ple: 1960q1-2009q2, model includ-
ing defense spending.










Govt. exp. R on C
Figure A-11: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated gov-
ernment revenue shock. Sam-
ple: 1960q1-2009q2, model includ-
ing defense spending.








Govt. R on C
Figure A-12: Reaction of pri-
vate consumption to government
revenue shock. Standard SVAR
model without anticipation. Sam-
ple: 1947q1-2009q2, model includ-
ing non-defense spending.







Govt. exp. R on C
Figure A-13: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated gov-
ernment revenue shock. Sam-
ple: 1947q1-2009q2, model includ-
ing non-defense spending.










Govt. R on C
Figure A-14: Reaction of pri-
vate consumption to government
revenue shock. Standard SVAR
model without anticipation. Sam-
ple: 1947q1-2009q2, model includ-
ing federal non-defense spending.









Govt. exp. R on C
Figure A-15: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated gov-
ernment revenue shock. Sam-
ple: 1947q1-2009q2, model includ-
ing federal non-defense spending.










Govt. def E on C
Figure A-16: Reaction of private consumption to government defense expendi-
ture shock. Standard SVAR model without anticipation. VAR includes GDP
and 3-month T-bill rate. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.







Govt. nonD E on C
Figure A-17: Reaction of private consumption to government non-defense ex-
penditure shock. Standard SVAR model without anticipation. VAR includes
GDP and 3-month T-bill rate. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2.












Govt. exp. def E on C
Figure A-18: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated govern-
ment defense expenditure shock.
Sample: 1947q1-2009q2, elasticity
of tax revenue to consumption at
t − 1: 0.












Govt. exp. def E on C
Figure A-19: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated govern-
ment defense expenditure shock.
Sample: 1947q1-2009q2, elasticity
of tax revenue to consumption at
t − 1: 0.5*0.6468.










Govt. exp. nonD E on C
Figure A-20: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated gov-
ernment non-defense expenditure
shock. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2,
elasticity of tax revenue to con-
sumption at t − 1: 0.










Govt. exp. nonD E on C
Figure A-21: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated gov-
ernment non-defense expenditure
shock. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2,
elasticity of tax revenue to con-
sumption at t − 1: 0.5*0.6468.









Govt. def E on C
Figure A-22: Reaction of private
consumption to government de-
fense expenditure shock. Standard
SVAR model without anticipation.
Sample: 1947q1-2009q2, elasticity
of tax revenue to consumption at t:
2.08.












Govt. exp. def E on C
Figure A-23: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated govern-
ment defense expenditure shock.
Sample: 1947q1-2009q2, elasticity
of tax revenue to consumption at t:
2.08.








Govt. nonD E on C
Figure A-24: Reaction of private
consumption to government non-
defense expenditure shock. Stan-
dard SVAR model without antic-
ipation. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2,
elasticity of tax revenue to con-
sumption at t: 2.08.





Govt. exp. nonD E on C
Figure A-25: Reaction of private
consumption to anticipated gov-
ernment non-defense expenditure
shock. Sample: 1947q1-2009q2,
elasticity of tax revenue to con-
sumption at t: 2.08.
48